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CONTRACT PERFORMANCE AND TEMPORARY
IMPOSSIBILITY

W

HEN performance of a contract becomes impossible through

no fault of either party, the courts today have little difficulty
in deciding that the parties are excused from performing while
the impossibility continues. The difficult question arises when the
impossibility ceases and one party then insists on performance.
Is the other party obligated to perform, or should the delay caused
by the temporary impossibility excuse performance?
This was the question presented to the court in the case of Pacific
Trading Co., Inc. v. Mouton Rice Milling Co.' Mouton contracted
in October and November, 1941, to sell rice to Pacific. Shipment
was to have been made in November, December or January. Pacific was a Japanese national. On December 7, 1941, the United
States froze its assets and made performance on its part impossible
until December 31, when it secured a license to perform under
three of the contracts involved, and January 31, when it secured
a license to perform under the remaining contract. There had been
a sharp rise in the price of rice in November and December. Mouton refused to ship the rice, and -Pacific sued for damages. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Mouton was liable for damages and that the temporary impossibility merely postponed the time for performance.
The case of Neumond v. Farmers' Feed Co. of New York2 involved the same question regarding an option contract for the sale
of a trade mark. The New York Court of Appeals held that after
the temporary impossibility caused by action of the United States
in World War I had been removed, the parties were not obligated
to perform because the value of the bargain had been materially
impaired by the delay, which lasted from April, 1917, until the
war was over in November, 1918.'
1 184 F. 2d 141 (8th Cir. 1950).
2 244 N. Y. 202, 155 N. E. 100 (1926).

3 "If the contract is still executory at the beginning of the war, if there are mutual
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

In Patch v. Solar Corporation4 the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that temporary impossibility of performance
under an exclusive patent contract did not permanently excuse
performance. The temporary impossibility in this case was caused
by the Federal Government's action in prohibiting the manufacture of washing machines during World War II and extended from
May, 1942, until the end of the war in 1945. The court stated
that the delay did not frustrate entirely the object the parties had
when they entered into the contract. 5
In Autry v. Republic Productions, Inc.,6 the temporary impossibility was caused by an actor's service in the Armed Forces during
World War II from July, 1942, until July, 1945. The Supreme
Court of California held that it would be unjust and inequitable
to require the actor to perform under personal service contracts
after the impossibility had ceased.7
The performance of a construction contract was rendered temporarily impossible by action of the United States during World
War II in the case of Village of Minnesota v. Fairbanks,Morse &
Co.' The Supreme Court of Minnesota decided that performance
after the delay, which lasted from February, 1942, until October,
1945, would have been substantially different from that contemplated by the parties and found there was no obligation to perform
after the impossibility ceased. 9
obligations that are yet to be fulfilled, the contract will be terminated when the essential purpose of the parties would be thwarted by delay, or the business efficacy or
value of the bargain materially impaired." 155 N. E. at 101.
4 149 F. 2d 558 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 741 (1945).
5 "We do not think that the impossibility of performance has persisted or will
persist long enough to frustrate entirely the object the parties had when they entered
into the contract." Id. at 561.
6 30 Cal. 2d 144, 180 P. 2d 888 (1947).
7 "It has been said that the doctrine of revival of contracts is one based on considerations of equity and justice, and cannot be invoked to restore a contract which it
would be unjust or inequitable to revive." 180 P. 2d at 895.
8226 Minn. 1, 31 N. W. 2d 920 (1948).
9 "The important question is whether an unanticipated circumstance has made performance of the promise vitally different from what should reasonably have been within
the contemplation of both parties when they entered into the contract. If so, the risk
should not fairly be thrown upon the promisor." 31 N. W. 2d at 926.
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The Supreme Court of Louisiana, in a slightly different fact
situation, reached a conclusion opposite to that reached in the
Mouton case in Pacific Trading Co., Inc. v. Louisiana State Rice
Milling Co., Inc."0 The buyer was the same in both cases, and the
reasons for the temporary impossibility were, therefore, the same.
The duration of the delay was also approximately the same. In the
Louisianacase the seller notified the buyer, as soon as it learned of
the impossibility, that it was cancelling all shipments. The court
said that the seller was justified in thus revoking the contract.
These cases are indicative of the recent trend of the law away
from the early common law rule which required a strict enforcement of contracts even though performance was rendered extremely difficult by unforeseeable circumstances. Under the common law, impossibility excused performance only where there was
a supervening illegality or death or illness in contracts for personal service.' If a person contracted to do an act, he was required
to do it. If he failed to provide in the contract for contingencies or
accidents, he was obliged to perform, even though performance
was extremely difficult.' 2 This early rule was not modified until the
Nineteenth Century, when the case of Taylor v. Caldwell" was decided. Under this and subsequent cases a contract was held to be
discharged if there was a destruction of any thing, the existence of
which was essential to the contract. Since then there has been a
gradual extension of the law of impossibility to excuse performance when justice demanded. Today the term impossibility includes not only strict impossibility but also impracticability be10 215 La. 1086, 42 So. 2d 855 (1949).
11 6 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1938) § 1931.
12 ,,...
[W]hen the party by his own contract creates a duty or charge upon himself, he is bound to make it good, if he may, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity, because he might have provided against it by his contract. And therefore
if the lessee covenant to repair a house, though it be burnt by lightning, or thrown
down by enemies, yet he ought to repair it." Paradine v. Jane, 1 Aleyn 26, 27, 82 Eng.
Rep. 897 (K. B. 1646).
133 B. & S. 826, 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (Q. B. 1863).
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cause of extreme and unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or
loss.

4

Many recent decisions excusing performance of contracts in
cases of extreme difficulty or expense have mentioned the doctrine
of frustration, which dates back to the English coronation case of
Krell v. Henry. 5 The courts have said that the essential purpose of
the contract has been frustrated by subsequent events and that performance should be excused or obligations under the contract discharged under the theory of frustration. In the same decisions the
courts have often mentioned the doctrine of impossibility as a
basis for the judgments. It is often difficult to determine on which
of the two theories a court is really basing its decision. Attempts
have been made to distinguish the two on the grounds that frustration applies when there is no impossibility. 6 This distinction
would have been a good one under the common law view of impossibility and the view of frustration as originally applied in the
English coronation case. However, since the doctrine of impossibility has now been extended to include situations where performance is possible but would be impracticable because of extreme
difficulty or expense, the distinction cannot now be made on this
basis. There appears to be no real distinction between the two
theories as they have been applied by the courts in recent cases.
And whether the case is based on frustration or impossibility, the
result is the same.' 7
A delay caused by temporary impossibility is one of the unforeseeable events which is often not provided for by the parties
and which will sometimes, under the modern application of the
theory of impossibility or under the theory of frustration, excuse
performance. When will performance be excused in such cases?
14 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 454.
15 L. R. [1903] 2 K. B. 740.
16 Lloyd v. Murphy, 25 Cal. 2d 48, 153 P. 2d 47 (1944).
17 "Whether you call it impossibility of performance or frustration, the result is
the same." Patch v. Solar Corporation, 149 F. 2d 558, 560 (7th Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U. S. 741 (1945).
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This question is one which the courts must answer after considering the contract itself along with the events leading to the delay
and all the other facts in the particular case. If equity and justice
demand that the promisor be excused, he will be excused. It is a
matter of weighing the equities. In doing so the courts have asked
several different questions. The question asked in the Neumond
case was whether the value of the bargain had been materially impaired. In the Patch case one of the questions asked was whether
the object the parties had when they entered into the contract had
been frustrated. The court in the Autry case asked the general
question whether it would be unjust and inequitable to require performance after the delay. The question which the court probably
asked in the Louisianacase was whether the return promisor acted
in good faith in revoking the contract when it learned of the impossibility. The Village of Minnesota case indicated that the question is whether performance after the delay would have been substantially different from that contemplated by the parties. We can
conclude from the questions asked by the courts in these cases that
where there is a delay caused by temporary impossibility, performance will be excused when there is a justified change of position. Performance will also be excused when the performance after
the delay would be materially different from that contemplated
by the parties when the contract was made. The length of the delay
is important in determining materiality, but the nature of the contract must also be considered in such a determination. For example, lapse of a month's time might make a material difference
in a rice sales contract; but in a personal service contract a longer
delay would probably be necessary before it became material.
Finally, since it is an equitable problem, the party seeking to be
excused must be able to show that he acted in good faith throughout.
Turning back now to the Mouton case, was the decision reached
by the court in that case a fair solution to the problem presented?
This question has to be answered by considering the contracts
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made by the parties and the subsequent unforeseen events occasioned by the war. Then, taking all the facts into consideration, it
must be determined whether equity and justice demanded that
Mouton be relieved of its contractual obligations. When this is
done, the conclusion is that the court did arrive at the correct answer to the problem. Mouton should not be relieved of its obligations under the contracts. Mouton had failed to ship prior to the
time of the impossibility and did not make its reasons for such
failure clear to the buyer or to the court. It was informed that the
buyer expected to receive a license to perform within the time
specified in the contracts. It took no action which indicated clearly
that at the time it learned of the impossibility it had reason to be.
lieve the impossibility would continue for a considerable length of
time. It offered no evidence to indicate that shipment at a time
other than during the time of the temporary impossibility would
have involved extreme difficulty or expense. Its supply of rice after
the delay was sufficient to meet all of its sales requirements. The
rice could have been shipped within a few days after the time
specified in the contracts for shipment. In view of these and the
other facts in the case, the court correctly held that Mouton should
not be excused from performing after the temporary impossibility
ceased.. There was no justified change of position. The delay did
not last for a length of time sufficient to make performance after
the delay materially different; and there was evidence that Mouton
did not act in good faith. The court, therefore, reached the right
decision, although its reasons could probably have been made
clearer.
The courts will be called upon in the future to decide more and
more cases in which a disappointed promisor is seeking to be relieved of his contractual obligations because of a delay caused by
temporary impossibility or some other unforeseeable event. The
modern trend of the law away from the common law rule of strict
enforcement of contracts will, in itself, tend to increase the number
of cases which will be brought to the courts for decision. The fact

